Overcoming democratic setbacks with public policies: strategies for anti-corruption in Mexico and public security in Brazil[*]

Superando los reveses democráticos con políticas públicas: estrategias para la lucha contra la corrupción en México y la seguridad pública en Brasil

Jaseff Raziel Yauri Miranda[**]
Alberto Vélez Valdés[***]

SUMMARY

1. Introduction / 2. Operationalization / 3. Overview and indicators, 3.1. Corruption in Mexico, 3.2. Criminality in Brazil / 4. Public policies paths and reactions, 4.1. Anti-corruption policies in Mexico, 4.2 Public security policies in Brazil / 5. Reformulating public policies / 6. Conclusions

ABSTRACT

The recent history of the Latin American democracies has not implied in deep actions to mitigate certain phenomena such as corruption and criminality. Furthermore, these problems compromise the quality of democracy as they are also related to political institutions' social impact and good governance. Thus, the article questions the overall characteristics that produced internal setbacks or failures to counterbalance corruption and crime in a public policy perspective. It also answers to what extent these same policies can be shaped to overcome failures and to improve social impacts. As the paper adopts a descriptive-generative logic, the first part exposes an overview of the indicators of corruption in Mexico and criminality in Brazil. The second part depicts the main patterns regarding anti-corruption programs and public security plans in both countries. The third part formulates two strategies: a sequential rooted model and the virtues of networking beyond the same public policies issues. The conclusions express that these strategies can mitigate corruption and criminality representing an opportunity to be considered by policy-makers to overcome democratic setbacks.

KEYWORDS:

Public policies, anti-corruption, public security, Mexico, Brazil.

RESUMEN

La historia reciente de las democracias latinoamericanas no ha implicado acciones profundas para mitigar ciertos fenómenos como la corrupción y la criminalidad. Además, estos problemas comprometen la calidad de la democracia, ya que también están relacionados con el impacto social y el buen gobierno de las instituciones políticas. Por lo tanto, el artículo cuestiona cuáles fueron las características generales que produjeron retrocesos internos o fallas para contrarrestar la corrupción y la delincuencia desde una perspectiva de política pública. También responde en qué medida estas mismas políticas, se pueden configurar para superar sus fallas y mejorar los impactos sociales. A medida que el documento adopta una lógica descriptiva-generativa, la primera parte ex-

pone una visión general de los indicadores de corrupción en México y la criminalidad en Brasil. La segunda parte describe los principales patrones con respecto a los programas de anticorrupción y los planes de seguridad pública en ambos países. La tercera parte formula dos estrategias: un modelo de raíz secuencial y las virtudes de la creación de redes más allá del mismo problema de políticas públicas. Las conclusiones expresan que estas estrategias pueden mitigar la corrupción y la delincuencia, y representan una oportunidad para que los responsables de la formulación de políticas tengan la oportunidad de superar los retrocesos democráticos.

PALABRAS CLAVE:
Políticas públicas, anticorrupción, seguridad pública, México, Brasil.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the last years, the Latin American democratic paths have not followed a linear course. Despite the improvement related to social and economic indicators at the beginning of the century, there are setbacks to implement political actions in order to counterbalance important issues such as corruption and criminality. For instance, several Latin American governments from different political spectrums still face problems related to corrupt activities and insecurity that affect their populations. Furthermore, these problems compromise the quality of democracy itself as well as its political foundations. That is, the quality of democratic procedures, in a broad sense, can also be fostered by reshaping and improving the quality of internal institutions and public policies. Both anti-corruption and public security policies can be considered as elements of good governance and rule-of-law efforts. As this proceeds, the paper questions the overall characteristics that produced internal setbacks against corruption and crime in a policy perspective. It also answers to what extent these same policies can be shaped to overcome their failures and to improve social impact of good governance. In order to do so, the article explores some strategies that were implemented at national level in the context of the recent political experiences regarding anti-corruption in Mexico and public security in Brazil.

Both countries are federal republics with large populations representing geopolitical powers in Latin America. Besides, they have a common feature because crime and cases of corruption have affected negatively their democratic recent history. Corruption and criminality can be understood as a type of offense against the law. But according to Stephenson (2015) corruption and democracy, for example, are not necessarily related in a positive and straightforward way. Democracy has an influence as far it affects the perception of corruption, especially after scandals and deviations of conduct. Indeed, corruption perception could be linked to setbacks in the development of democracy and misguided policies. In Brazil, for instance, the rhetoric of widespread corruption has undermined democratic values and offered the opportunity for some political groups to

reshape the governability and establish a conservative agenda. In sum, corruption and criminality are not new phenomena, but they present new challenges to contemporary politics of Latin American countries.

2. OPERATIONALIZATION

Although corruption and criminality are intertwined in a political sense, they will be exposed as separated policies. This separation is explained by the orientation and the interaction between State and extra-State groups. Meanwhile, corruption is a catch-all concept; it is in the public administration where the influence of corrupted networks affects the quality of democracy. Despite corrupt activities occur in private spheres as in the individual level, it is at the public and policy level that the effort on anti-corruption will be addressed. On the other hand, criminality could be related to corruption and vice versa, but the effects of violence can be easily verified in extra-State arenas. Even if corrupted officials or legitimate public institutions fight criminality, the impact of their action against crime affects regular people as well as their individual rights and conditions.

The article refuses a sort of public answers to differentiate the higher or sophisticate crime as corruption and the lower and rampant crime as delinquency. Despite this being a bias and a problem in many approaches, the public actions addressed in this paper will be divided considering a geographic division rather than a theoretical and legal discussion. In other words, both corruption and criminality will be considered through the perspective of public policies, but their difference and definition are explained by the interactions and consequences of their policies, as corruption in public sectors and crime affecting regular citizens will be the aim of our approach. Again, this study is not an exhaustive normative and theoretical re-conceptualization of those phenomena. The framework here is closely related to policy lines and rule of law efforts in a generative descriptive approach. Finally, the geographical choice and the topic division (corruption in Mexico and criminality in Brazil) have no a comparative purpose regarding some social issue or policy. This choice is a result of complementary angles and political research about what we consider closer issues in Latin America. It is also motivated by the fact that the authors aimed to build a shared vision about different public policies in the region.

Considering this, the paper questions what were the overall characteristics that produced internal setbacks or failures to counterbalance corruption and crime in a policy perspective. It also answers to what extent these same policies can be shaped to overcome their failures and to improve social impact of good governance. In light of that, the objective of the article is to analyze policy strategies on anti-corruption in Mexico and public security in Brazil. It is believed that democracy difficulties and setbacks can be surpassed with an improvement of policy action and of by institutional dimensions in both countries. Thus, the characteristic of this paper is to adopt a descriptive-generative logic. That means in to apprehend policy strategies of each State in order to propose theoretical directions to guide these same policies in a scenario of corruption and insecurity that affect many social *loci*.

In terms of structure, the first part exposes indicators and an overview of corruption in Mexico and criminality in Brazil. The indicators must be understood as bases for strategies and public policies rather than permanent concepts or ultimate interpretations of corruption and crime. In the second part, the main patterns or policy strategies against corruption or crime will be depicted. In the third part, the same strategies will be re-addressed in light of a sequential policy analysis. This analysis aims to formulate key

directions which can help to overcome the main difficulties faced by the public actions, answering how the policies can overcome failures and improve their social impact. The conclusion emphasizes some directions that can revitalize the quality of democracy, both in terms of democratic rule-of-law and public institutional procedures.

3. Overview and indicators

3.1. CORRUPTION IN MEXICO

Mexico is one of the Latin American countries that faced several challenges to achieve a high level of democratic development. For instance, according to the Democratic Development Index of Latin America 2016 (Índice de Desarrollo Democrático de América Latina, IDD-Lat by its acronym in Spanish), Mexico is under the average rate of 5,000 over 10,000, with a score of 4,454.

In terms of national corruption perception, a key indicator comes from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, Inegi in Spanish) which produced the National Survey of Quality and Government Impact for 2013 and 2015. The Table 1 was based on this survey and shows the variation of prevalence of corruption per inhabitants for each Mexican region. The rate is calculated by the total of corruption victims (who presented public complains, requested or contacted authorities) per 100,000 inhabitants.

Table 1. Corruption prevalence rate per 100,000 inhabitants in the regions of Mexico, on public procedures, carried out in dependencies of State government during 2013-2015.

	2013	2015	Variation	Percentage variation
Mexico	21,763	17,260	-$ 4,503	-20.69
Central region	29,354	19,307	-$ 10,047	-34.23
Northeast region	15,314	13,140	-$ 2,174	-14.20
Northwest region	18,060	21,137	$ 3,077	17.04
West region	18,570	15,626	-$ 2,944	-15.85
Southeast region	18,119	14,055	-$ 4,064	-22.43

Source: Prepared by the author based on Inegi (2014; 2016).
Notes: Standardized data.

As the table shows, in the last years, there was a reduction of corruption rates in the country with the exception of the Northwestern region. The reduction of 34% in the central region during the period from 2013 to 2015 must also be highlighted. According to Perrilliat (2013) those variations show that, in the 32 states of Mexico, the values of the "National Index of Corruption and Good Governance" are positively correlated to the highest number of employees in the State public sector. Thus, the greater concentration of government agencies in the central region (the State of Mexico and Mexico City) implies a high perception of corruption and improves the chances of fighting it. In sum, one explanation is that the incidence of corruption could be associated with the cases of corruption in the public sector.

On the other hand, it is important to analyze Mexico in a feasible indicator that measures the corruption perception as an aggregate approach. The Worldwide Governance Indicator of "Control of corruption" (WGI-CC) (2016) from the World Bank is an index that

measures corruption perception both in public and private sectors. Despite the orientation of this kind of index, their samples of study cover 215 countries and it has been published yearly since 1996 to 2016. As a result, it shows a range of -2.5 to +2.5, where higher scores mean less perception of corruption, and lower scores mean more perception of this phenomenon. This indicator allows extracting a trend of corruption perception during the period of 2002-2016 as stated in Graphic 1.

Graphic 1. Mexico in the WGI Control of corruption during 2002-2016.

Source: Prepared by the authors based on WGI-CC (2002)-(2016).

According to the index, a key finding is that Mexico experienced a setback of -0.59 during the period from 2002 to 2016. Yet, it is crucial to remind its bias, which contradicts the previous table, and put in context the index data. Just when Mexico began the initiative and discussion of the "National System Anti-Corruption" (Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción, SNA in Spanish), the decreasing from 2014 to 2015 was smaller than the 2013-2014 period, time of the most pronounced decreasing. At the end of December, an agreement between the President Enrique Peña Nieto and the three major political parties resulted in the "Pact for Mexico" (Pacto por México), which was signed to promote an "Anti-corruption Office". In spite of this, the initiative of reform that created the Pact was not approved by the Congress of the Union until 2015, indicating a late reaction against corruption and making difficulty any consistent evaluation.

3.2. CRIMINALITY IN BRAZIL
Public security is also a challenge for many administrations in Latin America. This is because criminality is one of the highest problems which defy State functions as well as the consolidation of democratic policies. The impact and fear of crime can be depicted from the biggest and most populated country in the region: Brazil. The Brazilian citizen security has been critical since the last democratization process in the 80's. As a starting point, one of the problems to handle this phenomenon was caused by the lack of studies and indicators about crime.

As stated by Sérgio de Lima (2008), crime data have been collected since 1988 by the National Institute for Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [IBGE]) to identify victimization incidence. By those years, criminality was studied with the objective to map the fear and sensation derived from crime, but the data not served as a criminologist input or as a tool for policy and juridical strategies. Fortunately, in the last years, there were improvements in the area.

For instance, in the last decade, the Brazilian administrations —federal, state and local— promoted tasks to collect more data related to criminal activities. Today, the main data sources are found in the Ministry of Justice, the public health system, the police forces and the surveys conducted in the Union and states (see Graphic 2). Their foremost publications began to be published since the middle 2000's being released by the annual report of the "Forum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública" (FBSP), by the statistics of the "Sistema Nacional de Informaçoes a Segurança Pública" (SINESP), by the criminal justice systems on each state, and by the Secretarias de Segurança Pública. During the last years, these reports gathered information on several types of criminal activities. The main picture refers to delinquency on streets, robs and homicides in big cities. Though, in the last years, gender and sexual crimes as well as victimization from/of police officers were also added to the reports.

In the case of homicides, an idea of its incidence comes from the civilian police forces and from the public health system. According to the last report of the FBSP, 61.619 Brazilian were murdered in 2017 in comparison to 58.467 victims in 2015. From 2011 to 2015, 279,567 people died due to citizen insecurity. Despite the proportion of Brazilian population, this indicator represents a higher amount of victims than the current Syrian civil war.

Information of the SINESP also assures an average of 23 homicides per 100,000 people in the country between 2011 and 2014. Meanwhile, this same rate was of 6.2 in the world in 2012 (UNODC, 2013). Furthermore, it is important to recognize the disguise of these numbers despite the steadiness of the homicide's rate as there have been significant changes in this kind of crime among the internal regions. The mobility of crime, from traditional areas like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, occurred towards Northern and Northeastern regions. Nevertheless, the rate is above 10 in all the states of Brazil (UNODC, 2013), especially in Western areas of agribusiness expansion and Northeastern capital cities. This movement evokes the resilience features and the permanent incidence of crime during the last years. Obviously, the overall picture is different from past decades, but again this highlights a rampant criminality scenario in several regions which defies public policies as well as demanded urgent institutional knowledge. As a result, the System for Statistic for Public Security and Criminal Justice was reformed since 2004 (Graphic 2), and being developed by the Ministry of Justice in order to confection public security plans as the PRONASCI. This and other plans will be addressed.

Graphic 2. Organization of statistics in public security.

National System for Statistics for Public Security and Criminal Justice (from 2004)

Periodicity	Bases of the System	Data Sources
Month	Base 1 — Criminal activity and security practices	Civilian Polices, Military Polices, Fireman and Local Guards
	Base 3 — National register of violent deaths	Civilian Polices and United System of Public Health
	Base 4 — Supervision of police activities	Internal Ombudsman Courts of Prosecution
Yearly	Base 6 — Criminal Justice stream	Civilian and Military polices, Criminal Justice Institutions
Yearly	Base 5 — National survey about victimization	Institute for Statistics
Yearly	Base 2 — Security Forces' profile	Civilian and Military polices, Fireman and Local Guards, Forensic Units

Source: SINESP, Ministry of Justice (2017).

As the Graphic 2 shows, the main data sources allowed basic lines to collect information related to criminality. This increased the completeness and the valuable information to understand the social reality. However, as the national system shows, it is of attention that the profile and redefinition of security forces, as well as the police supervision, are limited to security-related agencies. Moreover, the increase in the amount of data as a result of the technological modernization of the State, in turn, holds up a known opacity problem. The opacity problem means an overexposure and transparency discourses that were assumed without instituting changes in government rules and practices (De Lima, 2008). In short, the redefinition of roles and the overcoming of knowledge are less related to technical aspects, which are controllable, than to policy-making aspects. Therefore, as public policies have the capacity to assign responsibilities and resolve conflicts, they are really essential and must be considered in the actions against criminal activities.

This part exposed overall indicators of corruption in Mexico and criminality in Brazil. These indicators must be understood as basic lines to build public strategies and policies rather than permanent concepts or ultimate interpretations of corruption and crime. In the next part, the main characteristics of those policies against corruption and crime will be depicted.

4. Public policies paths and reactions

4.1. ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES IN MEXICO

When it comes to foster changes and improve anti-corruption policies in Mexico, as a starting point, the signature of international treaties has been really significant. For instance, two decades after the entry into force of the "Inter American Convention Against Corruption" (IACAC), the IACAC was the first treaty with a regional scope which was signed in Venezuela in 1996. It was followed by the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in 2004. The IACAC has its own institutions for implementation such as the "Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption" (Mecanismo de Seguimiento de la Implementación de la Con-

vención Interamericana contra la Corrupción, MESICIC by its acronym in Spanish). However, the recent hemispheric report of MESICIC in 2015 did not keep a continuous record of anti-corruption strategies.

At the national level, Mexico has implemented the mentioned "National System for Anti-Corruption" (SNA) as a strategy to solve the political crisis that affected many public institutions. The initiatives to create the SNA were promoted by civil society organizations, opposition parties with distinct ideologies, academics, and the private sector. For these political players, it was necessary to emphasize corruption as a complex network which exceeds the typical model of a person who corrupts and is corrupted.

Furthermore, a constitutional reform of the SNA was approved by the Congress in 2015 followed by a regulatory law in 2016. This reform will begin its implementation in 2017 (IMCO, 2016). Until then, the SNA has two main features. Firstly, it fosters the coordination between public institutions and citizens to prevent, to investigate, and to sanction crimes related to the misuse of public power toward private benefit. Besides, it promotes and takes measures to fight these illicit appropriations. Its scope covers federal and local scales across the three branches of government. Secondly, it turned mandatory for every public employee to present and publish their fiscal, patrimonial and conflict of interests' declarations (also called *Ley3de3*).

Mungiu-Pippidi (2016) identified that particularism interests allocated public resources in a context of institutional corruption. A considerable part of the public opinion may perceive that particularism, or a self-benefit, as a common practice in the public sector. This perception is consonant with the Graphic 1, which indicated a higher perception of corruption in Mexico, especially from 2013 to 2014, when paradoxically it decreased in the WGI-CC index.

Meanwhile, other public policies have been implemented, in the federal government, apart from the reform that created the SNA. For instance, a federal program called "Inhibition and sanction of corrupt practices" (in Spanish "Inhibición y sanción de las prácticas de corrupción", SFP, 2016) was implemented by the "Ministry of Public Function". According to the most recent external evaluation (Serpro, 2015), this has been scored as of medium-high quality program in 2015. Nevertheless, this program presents some problems concerning the profile of its targets and the administrative scope. This point will be addressed again in the part 3.

4.2. PUBLIC SECURITY POLICIES IN BRAZIL

The Brazilian public policies against crime could be studied at different levels. Since this phenomenon is present in the whole country, this section only considers the main features regarding the national programs on public security. The main institution on this issue was the Ministry of Justice. Its first plan for public security, released only in 2000, was sparked after the public commotion of a hostage situation in a bus that ended with mortal victims. After the media resonance, the program established 24 goals and 124 strategic actions against criminality. Among its actions, the plan created a financial aid program (Fundo Nacional da Segurança Pública) to fostering cross-sector initiatives in public security. The plan also reinforced the prerogatives and tasks of the "National Secretariat of Public Security" (Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública, SENASP). However, as suggested by Ignacio Cano (2006), the plan just rewrote most of the routine actions performed by the administration labeling them as "strategic" ones. Moreover, there was not a common direction and orientation to lead the several institutions to achieve the goals, both at national and state levels. In the first years, Eduardo Ribeiro (In Yauri, 2014)

mentioned that 85% of the financial aid was used to buy new security equipment or to repair police infrastructures.

After the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) election victory in 2003, the first program was substituted by the National Project of Public Security (Projeto Nacional de Segurança Pública). Among its main lines, the Project emphasized (on its discourse) the social vulnerability of young black people and their considerable victimization by homicides. Another key point was the effort to create a Unified System of Public Security (Sistema Único de Segurança Pública, SUSP), which intended to facilitate the organization of a common policy in terms of orientation and assistance for states and local governments. As the federative principles demand a certain distance between administrative levels, it was difficult to implement *de facto* any real strategy across several institutions and autonomies. The systemic action was replaced by incipient efforts and strategies that were never accomplished. In 2007, a new program was edited after criminal faction's attacks in São Paulo and after the commotion that followed the murder of a child in the case Joao Helio. The new "National Program of Public Security with Citizenship" (Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania, PRONASCI) deemed a deeper social and holistic approach to fight criminal activities, specially delinquency on the streets. The PRONASCI was the first plan which mentioned other issues such as incarceration (nowadays Brazil has the fourth largest population in prisons), a democratization of security procedures, the challenges related to racism, and gender violence, etc. The Program acknowledged these questions as overlapped logics rather than hierarchical ones influencing criminality. The Program also tried to improve its diagnoses by linking this issue with other ones such as education, cultural programs, health, and social welfare. Nevertheless, its accuracy on the diagnosis of the security problem has not implied in the improvement of institutional and administrative dimensions (Souza, 2011). Meanwhile, the rate of crimes like homicides has increased as mentioned above.

A real experience for combining professionalization of the security forces and institutional reforms, in order to attend and foster social demands, has become a never-ending story (Azevedo, 2009). There is still a dividing line between the policy action deemed by the national programs, the state administrations, and the police forces. For instance, the institutional role and legal prerogatives of the security forces continue the same (being regulated according to the Article 144 of the Constitution and with the organic division of the police forces). Furthermore, organizational conflicts and insufficient informative flows among the security institutions compromise any performance at a macro-level hampering coordination demands. Meanwhile, it persists a logic of taking repressive measures and in repeating the maxima "more policemen on the streets to bring more security" (Zaluar, 2007).

After political turmoils in the recent years, such as impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, the last Public Security Program (Plano de Segurança Pública) was established in 2017 and attempted to counterbalance public commotions after a prisoners' massacre in the state of Amazonas. This new program still seeks to promote cooperation sharing intelligence information among the federative states and the federal government. In addition, this plan will give emphasis to three cities and it will use surveillance tools to reconsider the incarceration problem and the transnational faction's wars that are threats to the public safety. Yet, it is soon to evaluate any policy action stemmed from this plan in terms of the quality of procedures and outcomes.

As it was attested, there is a considerable distance between the formulation and implementation of policies. Even when the knowledge about corruption and crime pro-

duced better indicators and diagnosis, difficulties from several scopes have emerged to hamper the policy action. To reduce the distance between those steps, as well as with other phases of the policy, the next section deepens the analysis of the public action in Mexico and Brazil in order to reformulate their paths and directions.

5. Reformulating public policies

In the case of corruption in Mexico, it was mentioned that the federal program called "Inhibition and sanction of corrupt practices" (SFP, 2016) was implemented by the Ministry of Public Functions. According to the most recent external evaluation (Serpro, 2015), this program obtained a score 4.2 of 5, which is considered as medium-high. This program is an example of a public policy against corruption worthy of mention in the current affairs. Yet, a disadvantage comes because it operates isolated from other internal programs and because it only covers public sectors at the federal level.

According to the official lines of the SFP Program, it aimed to contribute to the full implementation of the rule-of-law focusing in procedures against corruption (Serpro, 2015). These procedures could be deemed as a network for checking public agents and private entities that provide products or services to the federal administration. Despite the SFP reports did not quantify those services, the Program complements other ones such as the initiative "Promotion of the culture of legality and appreciation for accountability", and the Program "Expansion of coverage, impact and the preventive effect of the audit to public management". The SFP also seeks an alignment with the "National Plan of Development 2013-2018", which is linked to the Objective 1 in the "Program for a Close and Modern Government 2013-2018".

A particular strength regarding the Mexican anti-corruption programs come from the legal base as they represent an opportunity to standardize the information and patterns between them. But a weakness is that the National Plan lacks an Annual Working audit program. Moreover, as the SFP Program complements other ones, it is still not really aligned with other sectors resulting in a poor performance. To overcome this point, it is recommended to carry out an external evaluation of its procedures as well as a diagnosis of the whole SFP Program (Serpro, 2015, pp. 64-67).

In other words, even when the SFP Anti-corruption Program exists since 2010, it does not represent a coordinated policy with other institutions at the federal level. That is why its effect could not be reflected in the corruption perception indicators (as the WGI-CC), neither was essential on preventing *grand corruption*, which is deemed as one harm to several human rights (TI, 2016). Another threshold is linked to the Program internal scope as it is limited to the executive branch. Thus, the program does not benefit directly the citizenship as a regular public policy does. Finally, the participation of citizens and social groups, aside from denounces and complaints, is not taken into account at any other stage of the policy.

On the other hand, Hugo Frühling (2008) expressed that many security strategies in Latin America were limited either in terms of spatial area (as in the reduction of community policing to neighborhoods or operational programs to few cities) or in terms of time (succumbing to political vicissitudes and changes of electoral agendas). The Brazilian case was not very different.

The Brazilian national programs or plans for public security have made a point by considering, at least in theory, a sequential policy model. That is, they considered a strategy which contemplates the analysis of the social reality as well as the formulation

and implementation of certain goals. But they have failed in their implementation parameters to track down the unpredictable features of the criminal activities (like its geographic mobility). Other failures were the poor coordination among security players and the lack of connection with other policies that could have reinforced democratic and social aspects. That is, similar to the limited alignment in the programs against corruption in Mexico, the Brazilian public security plans have presented a lack of connection with other social arenas (such as with labor, education, health, and welfare). The plans have been dislocated, and, moreover, they assumed the "problems" from other areas. Thus, poverty, juvenile delinquency, social protest, etc., have been considered as issues that could be criminalized because they represent fear, crime, and disorder (Riveros, 2007).

In sum, among other patterns, the policies against corruption in Mexico and criminality in Brazil have produced uncoordinated efforts and a lack of continuity to implement political programs. Despite the increasing quantity and quality of indicators, there is still a problem when it comes to cover and give a direction to this information. Orientation blackouts and a lack of evaluation criteria have also compromised the information flows between the different administration levels. Considering this, it is possible to suggest two directions to overcome the mentioned difficulties.

The first direction refers to expanding and rescuing the sequential model of public policies. Just as the remedy for the "lack" of democracy is more and "better" democratic culture, a sequential policy action could also rescue the quality of the policy paths. That is to say, rather than discarding "failed" security programs with the consequent formulation of a new one (more appropriate to the political moment); policy actions should recover the idea of feedbacks and corrective outputs from previous policies. Thus, instead of conceiving plans with clear and progressive lines, the failures from previous plans might correct the "route" of new plans, encouraging mistakes and evaluations. In order to do so, more data and detailed diagnosis from social sciences are as essential as the implementation and management on the side of the administration. Betting on a feedback movement also means that unforeseen factors of all kinds can be skirted and could be transformed into a base for programmatic and permanent actions (Landman, 2010), avoiding incremental and monotonous cycles. For example, in a criminal justice reform, the products of a new penalization and the use of sentences can serve to complement and correct the own conception about penalties, the prevention of crime and the use of sentences. It also can be worked as an input for a social reintegration system. Therefore, the Mexican and Brazilian plans must invoke more sequential and responsive plans, which include long-term policies rather than simply contingent actions taken after public commotions. Moreover, this direction must address the quality and performance both of technical and social products.

As a second direction, there is a demand of establishing network relations. Governing in a time of uncertainty brings the necessity to congregate new players to provide or improve the public results against corruption and criminality. In times when the power of the State is diluted and overlapped by international and extra-State players (such as economic and financial institutions, external states, illegal powers, etc.), anti-corruption measures and the public safety can no longer be assured only through the action performed by State forms. In that context, "efficiency" models have pointed out the need for outsourced services, especially in a new era of fiscal adjustments in Latin America. However, if this movement is not carefully taken, especially in the security realm, it could increase war logics and warmonger discourses in many security practices and laws (Dammert, 2014). As a result, more individual and social rights violations will be ignored

and criminal law "exceptions" will be deployed to combat "internal enemies". Those deviations can be expanded again as in the times when public security and national security were strongly attached to each other (Sanseviero, 2007). Therefore, to mitigate these risks, anti-corruption and public security policies must incorporate a dialogue not only with players from the same issue. Those policies should also take advantage of the ability and mobilization of non-governmental associations, civil entities, and local and international human rights organizations with expertise in the field (PNUD, 2014). Though the Mexican and Brazilian contexts demand a specific framework in order to incorporate federative principles and extra-State players, the institutionalization of this direction is necessary to mature a greater coordination and to inhibit self-doing bias and closed habits. Besides, the second direction is a necessary condition to promote horizontal networks and decisions. Finally, the latter can be intertwined with the first direction in order to correct interpretations, alternatives, and interventions in an ever-changing social reality.

6. Conclusions

As stated above, public policies paths and strategies against corruption in Mexico and criminality in Brazil have been marked only recently by the development of more data and, in the second case, by better information about the crime. Nevertheless, if the nature of public policies still demands more and better data, another problem has emerged because of the data usage. At the national level, anti-corruption programs and security plans were proclaimed to handle the high perception of corruption as well as the public commotions due to criminal activities. That is, *ex-post* patterns or late reactions were the rules rather than efforts based on the knowledge stemmed from data and previous policies.

In Mexico, as corruption problem harm any project of democratic development, the National Anti-corruption System (SNA) has been promoted in 2015 to handle this phenomenon by coordinated policies. It is expected that the SNA will implement and promote new actions to mitigate corruption. Just two decades after the first international treaty against corruption (IACAC), Mexico has reacted building anti-corruption programs. Currently, a whole anti-corruption strategy is still being deployed. This strategy could have an effect in reducing the rates of corruption, and even to influence positively the democratic development of the country by rule-of-law dimensions. It is too soon to make deeper conclusions. However, the anti-corruption policies were not sufficient to reduce the perception and the cases of corruption.

In Brazil, if the homicides have decreased in traditional urban areas, its incidence has shown mobility to new regions and a permanent rate in the whole country. Meanwhile, the national programs or plans on public security have improved their diagnosis and discourses to restrain criminal activities, especially the delinquency on certain areas. Almost two decades after the first plan, the data and information related to this phenomenon began to serve as a tool for new plans. Nevertheless, the policy action stemmed from those plans was inconsistent in terms of their implementation. Whereas the major problems were related to uncoordinated efforts and a poor information flow among the multi-level administrations, the security strategies have remained "closed" in a paradigm of dissuasion and violent answers. Moreover, implementation and evaluation of the plans have been sporadic at the national scale and in terms of time.

Considering those countries and the challenges against corruption and criminality, the paper has expressed two directions to improve the quality of the procedures and outcomes related to both issues. The first direction implies in a sequential and feedback strategy to "vertebrate" any macro-action in a continuous and reconstituted cycle. This cyclic or sequential strategy is essential as a public policy route correction tool. For instance, it might correct technical tasks and guide institutional products emanated from the public decision-makers. A second direction emphasizes the importance of meaningful networks. These networks do not ignore material constraints and incorporate society dynamics and democratic preferences. Through a comprehensive, institutionalized, and permanent action, this direction of governance is combined with other sociopolitical agents and governmental institutions at the most different levels of the administration, in order to reconstruct political preferences.

Finally, it is expected that sequential and interconnected strategies can be included into current public policies. Speaking is easier than making, but a real implementation of these directions, which comprehend trial-error actions and learning and achievement corrections, might counteract closed and inhibitory incremental decisions that affect current policies. In doing so, the quality of democracy will gain in terms of reinforcement of the rule-of-law and will allow the aggregation of individual rights and social alternatives in the present contingency. As these strategies or directions can mitigate policy deficits, they also represent an opportunity ready to be considered to overcome democratic setbacks influenced by corrupt networks and criminal activities.

References

Azevedo, R. G. de (2009). *Justiça Penal e Segurança Pública no Brasil: causas e consequências da demanda punitiva. Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública*, 4, 94-113.

Brazil. *Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988*. Retrieved January, 2017, from http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm

-----. *Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública*. Relatórios Anuais. Retrieved March, 2017, from http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/publica/

-----. *Fundo Nacional de Segurança Pública*. Institui o. Ministério da Justiça (2000). Retrieved December, 2016, from www.portal.mj.gov.br/services/.../FileDownload.EZTSvc.asp?...BD56

-----. *Plano Nacional de Segurança Pública* (2017). Retrieved March, 2017, from http://www.justica.gov.br/noticias/plano-nacional-de-seguranca-preve-integracao-entre-poder-publico-e-sociedade

-----. *Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania*. Ministério de Justiça (2007). Retrieved December, 2016, from http://www.senado.gov.br/comissoes/CE/AP/PDE/AP_08_MinisterioJustica.pdf

-----. *Sistema Nacional de Estadisticas de Segurança Pública*. Ministerio de Justica. Retrieved March, 2017, from https://www.justica.gov.br/sua-seguranca/seguranca-publica/analise-e-pesquisa/download/estudos/sjcvolume2/sistema_nacional_estatiticas_seguranca_publica_justica_criminal.pdf

-----. *Sistema Nacional de Informações de Segurança Pública* (SINESP). Retrieved January, 2017, from https://www.sinesp.gov.br/estatisticas-publicas

Cano, I. (2006). Políticas de seguridad pública en Brasil: tentativas de modernización y democratización versus la guerra contra el crimen. *Revista Internacional de Derechos Humanos*, 5, año 3, 137-155.

Dammert, L. (2014). *Dos décadas de reformas policiales en América Latina. Lecciones y desafíos.* En G. Maihold, G., & R. Córdova Macías, *Violencia, delincuencia y seguridad pública en América Latina.* México: Cenzontle.

Frühling, H. (2008). Sistema de Seguridad Pública en América Latina: casos comparados. En: *Boletín, 7,* Comunidad más prevención. Santiago: cesc.

Índice de Desarrollo Democrático de América Latina (idd-Lat) (2016). Índice de Desarrollo Democrático de América Latina. Uruguay: Fundación Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Polilat. Recuperado en febrero de 2017, de http://www.idd-lat.org/2016/downloads/idd-lat-2016.pdf?nocache=7687652837

Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad (imco) (2016). Las siete leyes del Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción. Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad. Recuperado en febrero de 2017, de http://imco.org.mx/politica_buen_gobierno/las-siete-leyes-del-sistema-nacional-anticorrupcion/

Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (Inegi) (2016). Encuesta Nacional de Calidad e Impacto Gubernamental 2015. Recuperado en febrero de 2017, de http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/especiales/encig/2015/default.aspx

----- (2014). Encuesta Nacional de Calidad e Impacto Gubernamental 2013. Recuperado en febrero de 2017, de http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/especiales/encig/2013/default.aspx

Landman, T. (2010). Violence, Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America. In E. Desmond Arias, & D. Goldstein (Eds.), *Violent Democracies in Latin America* (pp. 226-241). Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Lima, R. S. de (2008). A produção da opacidade: estatísticas criminais e segurança pública no Brasil. *Novos Estudos, CEBRAP, 80,* 65-69. Recuperado de https://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0101-33002008000100005

Maihold, G., & Córdova Macías, R. (2014). *Violencia, delincuencia y seguridad pública en América Latina.* México: Cenzontle.

Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2016). The Quest for Good Governance: Learning from Virtuous Circles. *Journal of Democracy, 27*(1), 95-109.

Paes de Paula, A. P. (2005). Administração Pública Brasileira entre o Gerencialismo e a Gestão Social. *Revista de Administração de Empresas, 45*(1), 36-49. São Paulo. Retrieved October, 2014, from http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rae/v45n1/v45n1a05.pdf

Perrilliat, E. (2013). Desigualdad y corrupción. *La Gaceta de Ciencia Política,* 31-41.

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (pnud) (2014). Informe Regional sobre Desarrollo Humano. Seguridad ciudadana con rostro humano: Diagnóstico y propuestas para América Latina. Recuperado en febrero de 2017, de http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rblac/img/IDH/IDHAL%20Informe%20completo.pdf

Riveros, H. (2007). Rumo a uma política integral de convivência e segurança cidadã na América Latina: marco conceitual de interpretação-ação. Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento, PNUD.

Sanseviero, R. (2007). Entre las intenciones y las tensiones. En S. Escobar, & J. Ensignia (Eds.), *Seguridad pública en los países del cono sur. Los desafíos institucionales.* Santiago de Chile: Fundación Friedrich Ebert.

Secretaría de la Función Pública (sfp) (2016). Inhibición y sanción de las prácticas de corrupción. Secretaría de la Función Pública. Recuperado en marzo de 2017, de http://nptp.hacienda.gob.mx/programas/jsp/programas/fichaPrograma.jsp?id=27O006

Servicios Profesionales para el Desarrollo Económico (Serpro) (2015). Inhibición y sanción de las prácticas de corrupción. Evaluación de consistencia y resultados. México: Serpro. Recuperado en marzo de 2017, de http://www.transparenciapresupuestaria.gob.mx/work/models/PTP/programas/sed/evaluaciones/2015/270006pcr15.pdf

Souza, L. (2011). Políticas públicas e a área da segurança no Brasil. Debate em torno de um novo paradigma. Caxambu-MG: 35.º Encontro Nacional da Anpocs.

Stephenson, M. (2015). Corruption and Democratic Institutions: a Review and Synthesis. In S. Rose-Ackerman, & P. Lagunes (Eds.), *Corruption: Global Influences, Politics And The Market*, 92-133.

Transparency International (TI) (2016). *What is Grand Corruption and How Can We Stop It?* Transparency International. Retrieved March, 2017, from http://gopacnetwork.org/programs/grand_corruption/

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2011). World Report on Homicides. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved November, 2014, from http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-   analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf

----- (2013). World Report on Homicides. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved November, 2016, http://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf

Worldwide Governance Indicators – Control of Corruption (WGI-CC) (2000-2016). Worldwide Governance Indicators – Control of Corruption. World Bank. Retrieved March, 2017, from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports

Yauri Miranda, J. R. (2014). *Criminalidade na América Latina: Políticas de segurança pública no Chile e no Brasil, da transição â democracia*. Monografia Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG).

Zaluar, A. (2007). Democratização inacabada. Fracasso da segurança pública. *Estudos Avançados, 21*(61), 31-49.